The 2017 Giancarlo Stanton trade is a bit of a paradox – one side looks like a big winner on field value, the other on surplus value. How, then, should we view it?

In this, the fourth installment of our series on historic trades (in the first three, we looked at the Christian Yelich, Josh Donaldson and Chris Sale deals), we explore what they might have looked like using the model we have today.

Note: Since this site (and our model) didn’t exist when these trades occurred, we may not have access to all the data we currently use, so some of the inputs are not as accurate as they would be today. But let’s try it anyway, just for fun.

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On December 9, 2017, the Miami Marlins traded OF Giancarlo Stanton, along with $30M, to the New York Yankees for 2B/SS Starlin Castro and two prospects: 2B Jose Devers and RHP Jorge Guzman.

This trade was the big signal that the Marlins were doing a full-on rebuild. (They also traded Yelich, Marcell Ozuna, and Dee Gordon in that same offseason.) And who could blame them? They had just been sold to new owners (with Derek Jeter as a minority shareholder and figurehead president), and despite years of trying to compete, they hadn’t finished above .500 since 2009 – an eight-year run of below-average-ness. So it was time for a full-on fresh start.

The Yankees, meanwhile, were back to all-in mode after finishing second in the AL East and losing to Houston in the 2017 ALCS. This move, combined with the Gerrit Cole signing, showed they were serious about acquiring pieces to push them over the top.

So what would our numbers show if we’d had the model then?

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Imagine it’s December, 2017, and we’re looking ahead.

Giancarlo Stanton has just won the NL MVP Award, coming off a season in which he put up 7.3 fWAR and slashed .281/.376/.631, with a mind-boggling 59 HRs. His WRC+ was 158 (that’s 58% above league average). What’s more, that last stat wasn’t unusual for him – he put up a 158 in 2012,  a 161 in 2014, and a 155 in 2015. Dude is an absolute stud. And he’s still in his prime, at age 27.

There’s only one problem: his contract. At this point, he’s owed a whopping $295M over the next 10 years. That may not sound all that steep in 2022 terms, but here we are in 2017, and it’s expensive, especially relative to his expected production, with all risks included. Let’s take a look at what our model would show:

Name	Years	AFV	Salary	Surplus	Low	Median	High
Stanton	10.0	261.7	295.0	-33.3	-40.0	-33.3	-26.6

On the field, he’s worth over $26M per year. But his value is negative by about $33M. That’s because Miami overpaid him when they extended him in late 2014. Much like Colorado with Nolan Arenado, this was their big mistake (not the subsequent trade).

Why? It’s important to remember that there are significant risks to player contracts, especially ones with very long terms:

*Performance decline: As a player ages past his prime (typically after age 27), his production starts to go south. The older he gets, the more the decline accelerates.

*Injury risk: As a player ages, he also tends to get hurt more. And as these injuries add up, they impact his ability to play at the same level, or even play at all. As above, these tend to compound with age.

*Contract risk: When you commit a large chunk of your budget to one player, it reduces your ability to pay other players. The longer the contract, the more this is a problem, especially in concert with the above. Think of it as lost opportunity cost. When the Red Sox traded Mookie Betts, “financial flexibility” entered the lexicon to the point where fans mocked the term on social media. They were angry that Boston traded him, in part, because they didn’t want to pay him what he wanted. But guess what? As a result of that financial flexibility of not extending him, their budget was freed up to make other moves – they then made the playoffs and now have a bright future.

So when we look at Stanton’s longer-term future from 2017 on, our model sees a productive player, but one that’s going to decline more and more each year, and handcuff a team’s budget. That’s why, despite Stanton’s high production, his contract is underwater.

It’s also important to remember that, because Stanton has a full no-trade clause, Miami has virtually no leverage. Under normal circumstances, were that not the case, Stanton would likely fetch a premium, coming off an MVP year. But here, they have to take what they can get. And that means including $30M to help cover the shortfall. 

The Marlins’ return

So let’s see what they get back, starting with veteran infielder Starlin Castro:

Name	Years	AFV	Salary	Surplus	Low	Median	High
Castro	3.0	11.3	22.0	-10.7	-12.8	-10.7	-8.6

Castro is the same age (27) as Stanton, but nowhere near the same caliber of player. His value is negative because, like Stanton (albeit on a smaller scale), he’s overpaid: he’s set to make $10M in 2018 and $11M in 2019, with a $1M buyout for 2020. 

The Cubs had signed him to a 7-year extension in August 2012, in the midst of a 3-WAR season at age 22. They thought they were locking down a cornerstone talent who hadn’t peaked yet. But he then disappointed in both 2013 and 2015, after which he was traded to the Yankees. He was, at least, more consistent with New York, but barely so, putting up only 1.3 fWAR in 2016 and 1.9 fWAR in 2017. In this trade, then, he is merely a salary offset – the Marlins don’t need him, as they’re embarking on a rebuild, but the Yankees throw him in the deal to make the numbers work (both from a salary and value perspective).

The return package also consists of two prospects, whose valuation estimates at this time are (in $Ms; we’ve also adjusted all numbers to 2016-era dollars):

Devers	4.8
Guzman	2.6
Total	7.4

Both Devers and Guzman were rated in the 40+/45 range by most outlets at the time (based on the Fangraphs scale, with risks baked in). Note that Guzman’s value is lower because pitching prospects carry more injury risk.

So it looks like a remarkably fair deal on paper – the numbers match exactly:

Yankees get:		Marlins get:
Stanton	-33.3	Castro	-10.7
Cash	30	Devers	4.8
		Guzman	2.6
Total	-3.3	Total	-3.3

Now let’s see what happened after the trade, and in the years since.

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Giancarlo Stanton, fWAR and value produced (in $Ms, per Fangraphs), 2018-21, plus expected value:

Stanton	fWAR	Value	Salary	Surplus value
2018	4.3	34.5	25.0	9.0
2019	0.4	2.9	26.0	-23.1
2020*	0.4	3.0	9.9	-6.9
2021	2.6	21.0	24.0	-3.0
2022-2028^	6.6	52.9	164.0	-111.1
Total	14.3	114.3	248.9	-135.1

*2020 salary numbers are adjusted down for the shortened season.

^Projection based on our model. Note that the next seven are Stanton’s age 32-38 years, and the numbers bake in the aging-curve performance declines, the risks described above, and a positional adjustment for being a DH-only at this point. All salary numbers also include the $30M the Marlins are covering.

So it’s not looking good for the Yankees. Stanton delivered positive surplus value in only his first year in New York. Even though he bounced back to being productive in 2021, it was only modestly so – not quite enough to break-even on his salary, even after factoring Miami’s contribution. 

Yankee fans also may overlook the lost years in between, but those are killers. Stanton appeared in only 18 games in 2019, and 23 in 2020. Those two injury-riddled years also play a key role in determining his expected value going forward. History has shown that the best predictor of future injury is previous injury, and Stanton has had a few (notably a nagging calf strain). So when you look at that projected total 6.6 fWAR number, consider the realities of his health (as represented by those back-to-back 0.4 years) and his expected aging-curve declines.

Yankee fans like to argue that Stanton’s mammoth power makes him more valuable. But while there’s some merit to that, particularly in his elite exit velocities, the fact is, a home run that goes 500 feet is scored the same as one that goes 400, so the extra power doesn’t mean much in value terms.

How does it look now for the Marlins?

Let’s start with Castro, who was included in the trade as a salary offset. The best the Marlins could hope for at the time was that he would outperform his projections and become a positive-value trade chip. Let’s see if that happened:

Starlin Castro	fWAR	Value	Salary	Surplus Value
2018	2.3	18.6	10.0	8.6
2019	1.3	10.5	11.0	-0.5
2020	0	0	1.0	-1.0
Total	3.6	29.1	22.0	7.1

It did! Sort of. Castro managed to outperform his salary (and his expectations) in 2018, after which it would have been a good time for the Marlins to trade him. But they didn't, probably because at that point he was a 2B-only type, and we know now that the market heavily discounts those players. He then reverted to his mediocre self in 2019, the team bought out his 2020 option, and he became a free agent. So while they got positive overall value from him, it was meaningless, as it came in the tanking years.

And the prospects?

Both Devers and Guzman made it to the majors, but only for a cup of coffee so far. Devers played in 21 games in 2021, producing 0.1 fWAR and a 74 WRC+. Guzman pitched one disastrous inning in 2020, then 1.2 disastrous innings in 2021, after which he was DFA’d and outrighted after going unclaimed. Essentially, the miniscule positive value from Devers offsets the miniscule negative value from Guzman, so it’s probably best to just use their present-day trade values to measure them:

Devers	4.5
Guzman	0
Total	4.5

 

Summary

Now let’s look at the big picture:

 

Yankees got (including the Marlins’ $30M):

Player	Expected surplus value	Actual surplus value delivered/ expected	Gap
Stanton	-3.3	-135.1	-131.8

 

Marlins got:

Player	Expected surplus value	Actual surplus value delivered/ expected	Gap
Castro	-10.7	7.1	17.8
Devers	4.8	4.5	-0.3
Guzman	2.6	0	-2.6
Total	-3.3	11.6	14.9

 

Here’s the interesting part about this trade: If you look only at field value, the Yankees made out big. Over time, Stanton figures to deliver more than $114M. 

On Miami’s side, they got a meaningless $29M from Castro and, so far, nothing from the prospects. That’s a gap of roughly $85M in favor of New York. That’s what casual fans see. The-e-e-e Yankees win!

Not so fast. Even though the Yankees received by far the best player in the deal, that player is overpaid, oft-injured, getting older, and in decline. And they’re stuck with him for another seven years, which don’t look promising. As a result, from this point on, they’re looking at a sunk value deficit of more than $111M. 

So, on a surplus value basis, it’s not close. All told, the trade cost the Yankees more than $135M in value, whereas it benefited the Marlins by over $11M. By these metrics, which is what most trades are based on, Miami comes out ahead by $146.7M. This trade looks like an absolute steal for the Marlins.

Key takeaways

So why doesn’t it feel like a win for Miami? Probably because the main benefits were off the field, not on it. Financial flexibility is invisible, unless you’re a bookkeeper. But it does tend to manifest on the field eventually – as it did in Boston. 

Now that the Marlins are sending signals that they intend to be competitive again, you’ll start to see them spend some of that saved money on free agents (as they did with Avisail Garcia) and extensions of their best young players (like Sandy Alcantara). And they’re just getting started. So the money is being put to better use, when they need it. That’s smart.

The Yankees, meanwhile, will be fine. Don’t cry for me, New York. They reset their luxury-tax penalty exposure to zero in 2021, and look positioned to go well over the limit from here. In other words, even though Stanton is an expensive sunk cost, they can afford it. And if they win a championship with him, they’ll look at the trade as a positive.

Win/win? Maybe.